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1. Introduction: boundaries, limits and borders 
 
“Die Grenzen des Staates” – the Boundaries of the State – is the (abbreviated) title of one of 
the boldest classical liberal texts a German (then: Prussian) has ever written. Wilhelm von 
Humboldt (1767-1835) whom Hayek (1960, p.434) called Germany’s “greatest philosopher of 
freedom”  completed  most  of  this  essay  early  in  1791;  but  the  whole  text  could  only  be 
published posthumously in  1851 by the  author`s  younger  brother Alexander, the  eminent 
naturalist and explorer. A first English translation appeared soon in 1854 under the title “The 
Sphere and Duties of Government”.
1  It had a substantial  influence on John Stuart  Mill’s 
famous essay “On Liberty” (1859)
2. 
The German word “Grenze” has an intriguing variety of meanings: it means boundary, 
but also limit(ation), frontier, and border (control). “Die Grenzen des Staates” might thus 
allude  to  boundaries/limits  of  state  activity,  but  also  to  boundaries/borders/frontiers  of  a 
jurisdiction’s territory. In this paper I want to look at the “boundaries of the state” in both 
dimensions: the size of government and the size of nations. Is Humboldt’s radical idea of a 
“minimal state” more likely to be realized in an organization subjecting a small number of 
citizens/inhabitants under one rule of (one) law, or in a large state, or in a Union of (smaller) 
states? 
Historians  and  economists  give  no  definite  answer.  Historical,  empirical  and 
theoretical  findings  do  offer  manifold  confirmations  of  Tocqueville’s  (1835/1968,  p.196) 
famous claim that “small nations have been the cradle of political liberty”. However, there is 
no uncontested simple rule such as “small is beautiful” (or: classical liberal). Mainstream 
theories  and  observations  offer  only  context-dependent  trade-offs  that  change  with  many 
variables  such  as  market  conditions  (e.g.  size  of  and  access  to  markets),  political  and 
economic  transaction  costs,  production  and  communication  possibilities,  or  industrial, 
agricultural and military technologies, to name just a few
3. Even a historian would reach her 
limits if she were to present and discuss in one paper all these elements for many periods in 
many regions of the world. In this paper I therefore limit myself to the already rather 
ambitious task of looking at some interrelations between limits (of government activity) and 
borders (of nation size) as they present themselves in the Europe of today. 
The paper is organized as follows: in part 2, I give a  short account of Humboldt’s 
“boundaries of the state” that relates to many present-day challenges to classical liberalism: 
his blunt rejection of any “solicitude of the state for the positive welfare of the citizen” which 
also covers education, religion and any kind of moral paternalism. In part 3, I refer to the new 
economic literature on the “optimal size and number of nations” in order to discuss whether 
small states are more likely to be (nearly) minimal states. This literature tends to disregard 
Humboldt’s arguments in favour of exposing the individual to “varieties of situations” that he 
can choose and from which he can learn to “self-develop”. Therefore, in part 4, I argue that 
the  evolutionary  merits  of  this  exposure  can  be  illustrated  by  regarding  institutional 
competition as a Hayekian “discovery procedure”. In part 5, I look at the partial removal of 
borders within the European Union and, using some intuitions from club theory, I argue that, 
                                                 
1  Coulthard’s  translation  (1854/1996)  is  a  still  available  reprint.  A  facsimile  of  the  German  first  edition  is 
available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2318/Humboldt_Ideen1549_Bk.pdf. The full German title is: “Ideen 
zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen” which one could translate as “ideas 
concerning an attempt to determine the limits of the effectiveness of the state”. 
2 In his Autobiography Mill writes: “the only author who had preceded me … of whom I thought it appropriate 
to say anything, was Humboldt” (c.f in: Miniter 1991). The similarities are striking indeed; however, as Doering 
(2004, p.15) observes, “Mill interpreted Humboldt within his own utilitarian framework … He did not embrace 
the more metaphysical aspects of Humboldt’s neo-humanstic teleology”. 
3  See, e.g.  Kohr (1957/78), Jones (1981)   North (1981, 1998),  Rosenberg/Birdzell (1986), Mokyr (1990), 
Volckart (2000) who mostly argue that decentralization of power and competition amongst various jurisdictions 
has contributed to the rise of “Western” liberty, ingenuity, and (as a consequence) wealth. 2 
 
in terms of the size of European government, integration has become in most areas “too deep” 
whereas in terms of the size of membership in the Union the EU has grown “too big” in some 
areas  and  “too  small”  in  others.  I  conclude  with  a  plea  for  more  decentralization  and 
competition amongst jurisdictions as a way to lead, “as if by an invisible hand”, to at least 
somewhat more limited states. My qualified claim is thus: more, and more open, boundaries 
between states lead to more limited governments. 
 
2. Humboldt’s “boundaries to the state” 
 
For Humboldt (p.2)
4, political constitutions have “two grand objects ... first, to determine who 
shall govern, who shall be governed, and to arrange the actual working of the constitutional 
power; and secondly, to prescribe the exact sphere to which the government ... should extend 
or confine its operations”. The “true, ultimate purpose” not only of his essay but also of a 
classical liberal constitution is the latter object, since it “more especially determines the limits 
of  [the  citizen’s]  free,  spontaneous  activity”  (ibid.).  I  think  that  Humboldt’s  idealistic 
individualism  would  easily  embrace  Lord  Acton’s  famous  dictum  that  “It  is  bad  to  be 
oppressed by a minority, but it is worse to be oppressed by a majority” (1877/1985, p.13). 
This is Humboldt’s normative, individualistic, benchmark: “The true end of Man ... is 
the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent 
whole” (the very citation is the motto of Mills’ “On Liberty”). And for this development 
freedom is “the grand and indispensible condition” – together with “a variety of situations” 
(“Mannigfaltigkeit der Situationen” – which might be translated as “manifoldedness”) which 
enable individuals to enter freely into voluntary cooperation and association with equally free 
others  (p.11)
5.  Freedom and variety  –  both  ideals  are  dominant  and  ever  present  when 
Humboldt attempts to determine the limits of the state. They shall also be dominant when this 
essay develops. 
 
2.1 Against the Welfare State 
 
Humboldt (p.19) distinguishes two ends of the State: “either to promote happiness or simply 
to prevent evil”; it can aim at “Positive Welfare” or “merely at security”. The latter is later 
discussed as the protection of individual rights by ways of the Rule of Law. The former may 
be “manifested directly in such institutions as poor laws, or indirectly, in the encouragement 
of agriculture, industry, and commerce, of all regulations relative to finance and currency, 
imports and exports etc. (insofar as these have this positive welfare in view)” (p.21)
6. I would 
expect  that  almost  all  these  former  policies  were  then  (and  certainly  today)  regarded 
beneficial attributes of a modern state. Not so for Humboldt: “Now all such institutions, I 
maintain, are positively hurtful in their consequences, and wholly irreconcilable with a true 
system of polity”. Humboldt offers several closely related reasons: 
 
a)  “however wise and salutary” the effort of the state to “elevate the positive welfare of the 
nation” may be, “it invariably superinduces national uniformity, and a constrained and 
                                                 
4 If not otherwise indicated, all pages refer to Humboldt (1854/1996). 
5 Humboldt states in a rather Kantian way: „that reason cannot desire for man any other condition than that in 
which each individual not only enjoys the most absolute freedom of developing himself by his own energies, in 
his perfect individuality, but in which external nature even is left unfashioned by any human agency, but only 
receives the impress given to it by any individual of himself and his own free will … restricted only by the limits 
of his powers and his rights”. 
6 S.a. p.45: „the means by which freedom is limited with a view to welfare are very various in their character, as 
laws, exhortations, premiums, … immunities, monopolies, etc. and the power acquired by the sovereign as chief 
landowner”. 3 
 
unnatural manner of action” (p.21). Again, Humboldt’s ideal is “the free development of 
character in all its vigorous and multiform diversity of phase and manifestation”.  
b)  “these positive institutions tend to weaken the power and resources of the nation”, because 
the “man who frequently submits the conduct of his actions to foreign guidance ... can 
more  easily  ascribe  his  shortcomings  to  his  peculiar  position,  and  leave  them  to  the 
responsibility of those who have shaped it for him”, thus “his notions of right and wrong, 
of praise and blame, become confounded” (p.23, 25).  
c)  Also, welfare crowds out charity on the supply-side, as Humboldt observes: the fellow-
citizen “learns to abandon to [the State’s] responsibility the fate and well-being of his 
fellow-citizens”; this tends to “deaden the living force of sympathy and to render the 
natural impulse to mutual assistance inactive” (p.26). 
d)  Finally, the welfare state “cannot meet individual cases” (p.35), instead it establishes a 
growing bureaucracy which “requires an incredible number of persons to devote their time 
to its supervision, in order that it may not fall into utter confusion” (p.33). Supervision, in 
turn “necessitates new forms, new complications, and often new restrictions, and thereby 
creates  new  departments,  which  require  for  their  supervision  a  vast  increase  of 
functionaries” (p.39f). 
 
In short: in order for the citizen to fully develop her “positive freedom” (“self-development”) 
in  confrontation  with  a  “variety  of  situations”,  the  state  must  be  restricted  to  only 
guaranteeing “negative freedom”. 
 
2.2 Against state education, state religion, and moral reform politics 
 
Again, freedom and diversity are the decisive arguments that lead Humboldt to hold  that 
“national education ... organized or enforced by the State ... is at least in many respects very 
questionable” (p.65). The key word is “Bildung” which is only insufficiently translated as 
“education”. It refers to Goethe’s and Schiller’s views of aesthetics and means the cultivation 
and formation of one’s own personality in a way that defies any utilitarian purposes imposed 
from outside the individual himself (Doering 2004, p.13). “Bildung” may be viewed as an 
amalgam of “self-education”, “self-realization” and “self-cultivation” (Mueller-Vollmer 2011, 
p.15). Again,  human development  and “Bildung”  depend on the  “self’s”  exposure  to  and 
discovery  of  the  “richest  diversity”  (“Mannigfaltigkeit”).  State  education,  however,  “must 
always promote a definite form of development” and thus “repress those vital energies of the 
nation” (p.65, 67)
7. Consequently, “national education seems for me to lie wholly beyond the 
limits within which political agency should properly be confined” (p.71). 
There is some irony of history that one of the largest state-run German universities is 
named after Wilhelm (and Alexander) von Humboldt who was Prussian minister of Public 
Instruction  from  1809  to  1810  and  indeed  spent  most  of  his  career  serving  the  Prussian 
government.  One  explanation  is  that  Humboldt  was  after  all  a  reformer  and  not  a 
revolutionary (Doering 2004). Also, he mostly served during the short-lived Prussian reform 
era after the Napoleonic wars when von Stein and von Hardenberg introduced decentralized 
self-administration  in  Prussia;  and  Humboldt  aimed  at  doing  the  same  for  schools  and 
universities
8. In 1819, Humboldt drafted a plan for a liberal constitutional monarchy in the 
                                                 
7 Humboldt’s argument for private (market) education is based also on supply-side incentives: “tutors better befit 
themselves, when their fortunes depend upon their own efforts, than when their chances of promotion rest on 
what they are led to expect from the State. There would, therefore, be no want of careful family training, nor of 
those common educational establishments which are so useful and indispensible.” (p.69f). 
8 Humboldt introduced a multi-tiered system of elementary school, Gymnasium and university open to all talents 
irrespective of rank or status. He advocated the abolishment of military schools and the closing of schools for 
nobility; and home schooling (which he enjoyed himself   also in economics, natural law and philosophy) 4 
 
wake  of  the  reactionary  anti-liberal  “Karlsberg  Decrees”.  King  Friedrich  Wilhelm  III 
immediately dismissed him from all his duties on New Years Eve of the same year (Mueller-
Vollmer 2001, p.9). 
When discussing “religion” and “moral reform” in two longer chapters, Humboldt 
attacks much of what in today’s language would be called “merit goods” to be provided or at 
least subsidized by the state. He does not ignore that religion and morals form a “cement of 
society” (Elster 1989). But he is convinced that any state privilege for any religion or any 
state  programme  for  moral  education  will  do  more  harm  than  good.  For  Humboldt,  the 
“simple idea of moral perfection is great, and inspiring, and exalted enough to require no 
other veil or form” (p.78). A religious belief in “a Being who is at once the source of all truth, 
and the sum of all perfection” can be helpful in gaining “greater certainty and consistency” 
(p.77) in our quest for moral perfection, but it is not “necessarily connected to it” (p.80). For 
politics, this implies that “all which concerns religion lies beyond the sphere of the State 
activity” (p.96). The state can support “self-development” of individuals only “by removing 
obstacles that prevent the citizen’s mind from becoming familiarized with religious ideas, and 
by promoting a spirit of free inquiry”. If the legislator “ventures to direct or diffuse a spirit of 
religiousness; if he shelters or encourages certain definite religious ideas; or if, lastly, he dares 
to require a belief according to authority in lieu of a true and sincere conviction”, he will 
destroy  liberty,  diversity  and  “most  effectively  thwart  or  deaden  the  soul’s  noblest 
inspirations” (p.86). 
The very same reasons oblige Humboldt’s minimal state to abstain from all forms of 
“moral reform” or “any attempt to operate directly or indirectly on the morals and character of 
the nation” (p.113). Humboldt not only refers to “the fact that coercion and guidance can 
never  succeed  in  producing  virtue”;  it  also  “engenders  all  selfish  desires,  and  all  mean 
artifices of weakness” (p.111). The result would be a paternalistic state and society which 
may be “tranquil, peaceable, prosperous” – but would “seem to me a multitude of well cared-
for slaves, rather than a nation of free and independent men, with no restraint save such as 
was required to prevent any infringements of rights” (p.110). 
 
2.3 Humboldt’s minimal state 
 
What remains as the only obligation of the state is described by Humboldt in very much the 
same vein in which James Buchanan (1975) describes the role of the “protective state”: a state 
limited  to  the  provision  of  security  which  Humboldt  called  “negative  welfare”  or  Hayek 
(1960. p.19) would call the “negative” values of a free society: liberty, peace and security. 
Humboldt’s argument (p.51ff), in modern language, runs as follows: in a state of nature, 
individuals engage in wasteful conflict, armament, conflict-avoidance and revenge. Thus they 
are kept from engaging in more productive efforts and from reaping mutual gains from trade. 
Only a third party such as the state has a comparative advantage in the use of violence and can 
help freeing individuals from a Prisoners’ Dilemma
9. However, this logic applies (only) to 
                                                                                                                                                         
remained possible. By strictly limiting the King’s influence on education, Humboldt fostered autonomy and 
decentralization of schools and universities. 
9 As the reader might be thinking that I am interpreting too much into Humboldt, here are his own words: “Now, 
without security, it is impossible for man either to develope his powers, or to enjoy the fruits of his exertion … 
this is a situation which man is wholly unable to realize by his own individual efforts … Wrong begets revenge; 
and revenge is but a new wrong. And hence it becomes necessary to look for some species of revenge which 
does not admit of any other retaliation – that is the punishment inflicted by the State, or for a settlement of the 
controversy which obliges the parties to rest satisfied, viz. the decision of the judge ... our States are in a far 
more favourable position than we can conceive that of man in a state of nature to be … that the maintenance of 
security, as well with regard to the attacks of foreign enemies as to the danger of internal discord, constitutes the 
true end of the States” (p.52f).  5 
 
matters  of  securing  individual  (property)  rights,  conflict  settlement  and  defence  against 
foreign aggressors
10. 
It must be noted that Humboldt takes much care to narrowly define “security” and 
“protection” in the second half of his book since these concepts can also be used by adherents 
of  “positive  welfare”  (“social  security”)  or  state  intervention  (“police  state”)  to  reduce 
freedom beyond any limits of state activity. “Without some distinct definition, it is impossible 
to re-adjust those limits and repair that confusion” (p.115). Humboldt defines security as “the 
assurance of legal freedom” which means that citizens are “secure, when, living together in 
the full enjoyment of their rights of person and property, they are out of the reach of any 
external disturbance from encroachments of others” (p.116f). It is only “actual violations of 
right” which require the state to act – but not results of spontaneous activities (say, on the 
market) as may be judged “based on the shifting grounds of utility” (p.117)
11. Welfare statists, 




3. Are small nations more likely to be minimal states? 
 
In 1791, when Humboldt wrote his essay on the “boundaries of the state”, there were many 
borders within what only 80 years later would become the German nation or empire. One 
could count some 300 kingdoms, principalities, city-states or church-owned territories. Some 
of Humboldt’s contemporaries and today’s economic historians (e.g. Volckart 2002, Vaubel 
2005)  claim  that  the  availability  of  many  alternative  jurisdictions  nearby  have  greatly 
contributed to the advancement of personal liberties, especially for artists and academics, but 
also for merchants, traders and craftsmen. We will come back to this aspect of Humboldt’s 
praised availability of “varieties of situations and circumstances” in the next part.  
In his “boundaries of the state” Humboldt does only occasionally discuss the size of 
nations. But the general thrust of his argument is clearly in favour of small states governed 
upon the consent of citizens
13. In an argument that anticipates much of what Hayek (1939/80) 
                                                 
10 Humboldt (p.55ff) does not condemn war as such; he quite idealistically sees in it an occasion in which 
individual  “endurance and  fortitude  are  steeled and tested” and  freedom defended. For the  same reason  he 
“argues against the maintenance of standing armies” which condemn “in time of peace a considerable portion of 
the nation to this machine-like existence”. 
11 Here again one can feel Kant’s influence. Compare Kant’s famous dictum that “Welfare … has no principle, 
neither for him who receives it, nor for him who distributes it (one will place it here and another there); because 
it depends on the material content of the will, which is dependent upon particular facts and therefore incapable of 
a general rule” (Kant 1798, section 2, para.6). 
12 Again, some quotes to substantiate my claim: “it is not enough to justify such restrictions, that an action 
should imply damage to another person; it must, at the same time, encroach his rights”. This seems also to 
qualify John Stuart Mill’s “harm principle” when he (1859) discusses the issue of paternalism (see Wohlgemuth 
2010 or Hayek 1960, p.145 on this issue). Humboldt (p.124) insists: “The State, then, is not to concern itself in 
any way with the positive welfare of its citizens, and hence, no more with their life or health, except where these 
are imperilled by the actions of others” – and: in an “unrightful” way (p.124). Thus: “he who utters or performs 
anything calculated to wound the conscience and moral sense of others, may indeed act immoraly; but … he 
violates no right. The others are free to cut off all intercourse with such a person, and, should circumstances 
render  this  impossible,  they  must  submit  to  the  unavoidable  inconvenience  of  associating  with  men  of 
uncongenial  character,  not  forgetting,  moreover,  that  the  obnoxious  party  may  likewise  be  annoyed  by  the 
display of peculiar traits in them.” (p.121f). In this vein, Humboldt also argues for civil laws to allow for divorce 
without “extenuating reasons” (p.135), the legalization of suicide and “even the taking of a man’s life with his 
own consent” (p.154) 
13 When the question of a unified Germany was more and more on the agenda (also for German cla ssical 
liberals), Humboldt (1813/1968) published a “Memorandum on the German Constitution” in which he advocated 
a decentralised confederation (instead of a consolidated federal government) arguing that cultural and political 
diversity should by no means be reduced, since “Such diversity alone is not only harmless, but is necessary in 
order to reconnect the constitution of each land (state) strictly with the peculiarity of its national character” (c.f. 6 
 
and Buchanan/Tullock (1962) have developed much later, Humboldt (p.48f) argues that (a) 
consent of all citizens is a necessary element of a just constitution, (b) consent would preclude 
a welfare state that went beyond a mere protective “minimal state”  and that can only be 
upheld by ways of a majority vote system, (c) “exit” remains the only alternative for non-
consenting citizens, and (d) the larger the state (both in terms of citizens and “solicitudes”) the 
less likely can it be beneficial and consensual
14. 
Are small nations more likely to be minimal states? Many classical liberal authors 
thought so
15. But, as already indicated in the introduction, there is no unqualified simple 
answer to the question. Throughout history, the number and size of nations has varied 
substantially as a reaction to many endogenous and exogenous factors. Recently, the number  
of independent states has multiplied (from 76 in 1946 to about 193 in 2003, Alesina 2003, 
p.302
16). Some states are as large as China or India, some as small as Liechtenstein or Tuvalu. 
In terms of GDP per capita, amongst the five largest countries only the USA is “rich” in terms 
of per capita income. Really small countries such as Luxembourg or Liechtenstein are the 
richest in the world. Also the ranking of “Economic Freedom of the world” (Fraser Institute 




3.1. Benefits and costs of nation size 
 
Meanwhile,  a  large  number  of  economic  theories  and  econometric  studies  have  been 
undertaken to determine an “optimal” size (and number) of nations and confront this with the 
actual sizes and numbers. Today’s literature, initiated by David Friedman (1977), is mostly 
inspired  by  works  of  Alberto  Alesina  and  Enrico  Spolaore
18. I cannot here give a full 
summary and interpretation of this enormous literature. But  the general idea is simple (and 
thus lends itself to neoclassical equilibrium modelling): “Borders are a man-made institution” 
(Alesina 2003, p.301). And: borders define the costs and benefits of a nation’s size
19. As a 
                                                                                                                                                         
in Doering 2004, p.16). The basic motives for German liberals to support patriotic unionists were (a) to establish 
a common market or free trade zone (“Zollverein”) and to provide external security against Napoleonic France. 
14 Here is the argument in Humboldt’s own words: „the point to which the whole argument conducts us, is the 
necessity of securing the consent of every individual. But this very necessity renders the decision by a majority 
of voices impossible; and yet no other could be imagined in a State union which, to regard single objects, 
extended its activity to the positive welfare of the citizen. Nothing would be left to the non-consenting but to 
withdraw themselves from the community in order to escape its jurisdiction, and prevent the further application 
of a majority of suffrages to their individual cases … it is … certain that every larger association is in general 
less beneficial … In large associations [man] is too prone to become an instrument merely”. 
15 I have already mentioned de Tocqueville (1835/1968). Spolaore (2005, p.1) found quotes in Pl ato’s “Laws” 
that 5.040 heads of family were the optimal size of a “state”; and that in Aristotle’s “Politics” populous states in 
which people no longer know each other cannot be “run by good laws”. Here, of course, the organization of a 
small group is the measuring rod and not the universalizable laws governing a spontaneous order or “open 
society (Wohlgemuth/Sideras 2004). Still, a modern Tocquevillian version of decentralization combined with 
openness can be found in Röpke (e.g. 1959, part 3). 
16 Most of the increase is, of course, due to the evaporation of the Soviet empire The recent (mostly peaceful) 
changes of the European political map is quite unprecedented, as Lübbe (2007) argues, who counts that from 
1918 until today, the number of sovereign states increased more than 7fold in Eastern Europe (including the old 
Osman Empire). 
17 These are the top five, followed, however, by the United States, Canada, Australia – and Mauritius.  
18 Their classical journal contribution is Alesina/Spolaore (1997); a reade r-friendly book-length publication of 
their ideas is Alesina/Spolaore (2003). 
19 It is quite stunning to see how almost all criteria for costs and benefits of the size of nation can already be 
found in Tocqueville’s famous chapter VIII, part V on the “Advantages of the Federal System in General and its 
Special Utility in America”. 
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consequences,  borders  can  be  “optimized”  –  in  theory  (“chosen  by  a  hypothetical  social 
planner maximizing a social welfare function”, Alesina 2003, p.305). 
On the benefit side of larger nations are economies of scale in the production of public 
goods, the possibility to internalize externalities within the nation and the availability of a 
larger market. Larger states imply lower per capita costs (economies of scale) in areas such as 
“general-policy  coordination  and  administration,  defense  and  foreign  policy,  a  legal  and 
judicial system, police and crime prevention, a monetary and financial system, infrastructure 
for  communication,  public  health,  and  so  on”  (Spolaore  2005,  p.4).  Cross-regional 
externalities or “shocks” (environmental, or “social”) can also be better “internalized” (via 
regulation and redistribution) within one nation (Alesina/Spolaore 2003, ch. 10). And: “larger 
nations mean larger domestic markets when political borders are associated with barriers to 
international exchange” (Spolaore 2005, p.4). 
On the cost  side of larger nations,  only one category is  seriously been taken into 
account: that “larger populations are associated with higher heterogeneity of preferences of 
different  individuals.  Being  part  of  the  same  community  implies  sharing  jointly-supplied 
public goods and policies in ways that cannot satisfy everybody’s preferences”.
20 The extreme 
case  is  that  nations  extend  so  far  as  to  be  forced  to  accommodate  “ethno-linguistic 
fractionalism which is shown to be inversely related to measures of economic performance, 
economic freedom, and quality of government” (Spolaore 2005, p.5). 
 
3.2 What would Humboldt say (today)? 
 
If Humboldt were to look at the theoretical and empirical findings of the Alesina school, he 
might, at first, be puzzled. If his sole “solicitude” of the state – the provision of security 
against infringements of the negative liberty of citizens and against foreign intruders – is such 
a classical “public good” it should be more “efficiently” be provided by large nation states 
(“larger countries can provide better and cheaper security for their citizens”, Spolare 2005, 
p.17). At the same time, Humboldt might be appalled by the additional amount of “public” (or 
“meritory”) goods relating to “positive welfare” which large bureaucracies could also provide 
at lower costs per tax-payer. And finally, he might ponder on why “diversity” shows up solely 
on the cost-side of the optimization equation and not as a benefit to the citizen exposed to 
“self-education” within a realm of freedom and a “variety of situations”. 
I  cannot  go  here  more  into  contrasting  an  alleged  reaction  of  Humboldt  with  the 
equilibrium  models  of  the  Alesina  school.  A  closer  look  at  the  simplifying  assumptions 
underlying their hypothesis that “through a democratic process, more countries are created 
than with a social planner who maximizes world average utility” (Alesina/Spolaore 1997, 
p.1028) might make him frown
21. The hypothesis that autocratic, “Leviathan” states tend to be 
                                                 
20 Indeed, what is often called “public good” can be a “bad” for some. A public health system, a standing army or 
a  state-sponsored  religion  may  show  technical  attributes  of  “non-excludability”  and  “non-rivalrous 
consumption”;  however  for  a  Humboldtian  liberal,  they  would  be  “hurtful  in  their  consequences”  –  the 
consequences of not being able to “exlude onself” from having to “consume” (and pay for) services that the 
liberal would reject. 
21 These assumptions rely on a model with given preferences, perfect information of voters and politicians, the 
median voter dictating policies, no “exit” of mobile resources, and many other exogenous variables that make 
optimization manageable. Especially the costs of “diversity” are determined based on a simple Hotelling-Downs 
model of distance from a given median position. For a rather radical critique of this model’s ability to grasp 
political competition in a democracy, see Wohlgemuth (2005). Friedman (2005) argues that the Alesina et. al 
hypothesis (democracies produce too many, too small states) is “an artifact” of the assumption of linearity of 
“distance”.  If  distance  (diversity,  or  heterogeneity)  were  assumed  to  produce  more  than  linear  costs,  the 
hypothesis would already be reversed. Hermann-Pillath (2009) offers many reasons why “there is no direct 
impact of diversity on the costs of government” (p.35). One is that, based on the logic of “rational ignorance” of 
voters (Downs 1957) and “preference falsification” (Kuran 1995), larger nations might indeed “converge toward 8 
 
and remain “too big” (at least in terms of population subjected to uniform expropriation of 
rents, s. Alesina 2003, p.306) should not surprise him
22. However, he would probably endorse 
the view, also supported by the calculus of Alesina et. al., that smaller states (both in terms of 
number  of  citizens  and  of  “solicitudes”)  tend  to  benefit  from  and  support  present  trends 
towards free trade, openness and peace – the very pillars of the “negative welfare” that define 
the “boundaries of the state” and give citizens the possibilities to “self-develop”. 
It is here that the neoclassical mechanistic calculus coincides with classical-liberal, 
Humboldtian  idealistic  gut-feeling  about  the  proper  size  and  scope  of  nations  and 
governments: Historically, “absolutist regimes needed ‘size’ to support wars and an inward 
looking economy … wars made states” (Alesina 2003, p.310). At the same time, peace and 
trade made freedom and wealth possible – both historically – e.g. in small states such as 
Italian cities during Renaissance, or between members of the Hanseatic League (Dollinger 
1977),  but  also  in  small  states  (such  as  Luxembourg,  Liechtenstein,  Switzerland,  or 
Singapore) today: “With peace, democracy, and free trade small and relatively homogenous 
communities can enjoy independence and prosperity” (ibid., p.312). As a consequence, “small 
countries have an interest in maintaining free trade” (Spolaore 2005, p.16)
23. 
Under these very conditions (which seem much more prevalent today than during the 
last decades), nation states may indeed have become “too large” and a settlement of peaceful 
“secession”  (or  milder  forms  of  granting  more  local  autonomy)  no  longer  poses  a  threat 
neither to the old nor to the newly forming nations. Communities can now more easily opt out 
of their allegiances that formerly tied them to overly large (both: protective and welfare) 
states and opt in to the globalized market (under the rules of the WTO, or NAFTA, or the EU) 
and  have  their  security  concerns  covered  by  membership  with  NATO
24.  With increasing 
economic integration, secession becomes less costly and more beneficial, as the bre ak-up of 
the Soviet Union has shown and regional separatism in Spain, Belgium, or the UK might 
show in the future
25. 
In part 5, I  try to show that, within the EU as it is today, opting out of (parts) and 
opting in (parts) of the European Union still meets w ith tremendous obstacles. As a most 
complex and far-reaching “multi-purpose club”, the EU mostly adheres to an “all-or-nothing” 
and  “one-size-fits-all”  ideology  of  membership  that  is  able  to  frustrate  both  mutually 
beneficial secession and flexible (partial) accession. Before I turn to these intricacies of the 
political economy of European integration, let me shortly return to  Humboldt’s dominant 
theme of (negative) freedom and “Mannigfaltigkeit” that both contributed to the formation 
(“Bildung”) of the “European miracle” (Jones 1981). Freedom (of choice) and variety (“of 
situations”) have one common denominator, both as a prerequisite and as a consequence: 
competition.  
                                                                                                                                                         
a common state of rational ignorance” and a state of large-scale, path-dependent, misrepresentation of one’s true 
preferences. Hermann-Pillath has done much research into Chinese culture … 
22 The “Leviathan”  model assumes rent-maximization of  monopolists  who only  need  support of a strategic 
minority of the population. 
23  Röpke  (1959,  p.170)  observes  that  citizens  of  small  and  industrialized  nations  “follow  far  less  than  the 
inhabitants of large states the temptations of economic irrationality, propaganda for autarky, exchange-control or 
devaluation”; also “cartels … can here pursue their harmful practices only within certain limits”; therefore small 
states are “today particularly indispensable supports of the world economy” (p.171). 
24 It is no surprise that in Switzerland’s direct democracy adherents of abolishing the army gain ground since 
there is no threatening cavalry in sight, whereas the Chinese government seems to invest more  (in absolute 
terms) in military spending (which might be a better long-term investment than buying US treasury bonds). Of 
course, the question of free-riding on other’s tax-payers money spent on providing a (near) global public good 
does arise. 
25 The threat of Secession places an upper limit on democratic states’ power to tax, as Buchanan/Faith (1987) 
have shown. Both Secession (and unification) can support (classical-liberal) reform, as Yarbrough/Yarbrough 
(1998) have argued (also with interesting reference to the Czech-Slovak secession. 9 
 
 
4. The evolutionary merits of “varieties of situations”: institutional competition 
 
The work of the Alesina school on the (optimal) “size of nations” is rich in insights. But its 
welfare economic optimization approach ignores important aspects that only an evolutionary 
view  of  politics  (and  markets)  can  unveil.  Alesina  et.  al.  mostly  look  at  an  optimization 
calculus  of  one  nation  in  isolation  (“we  assume  that  individuals  are  not  mobile”, 
Alesina/Spolaore 1997, p.1031). But with smaller nations and freer trade there should be a 
higher “degree to which nations must compete for citizens and capital” (Friedman 2005). 
  In short:  there should be  institutional  competition  which, by  qualifying the state’s 
monopoly of power, should be able to further limit state activities  – and, by providing a 
discovery  procedure  and  learning  process,  inter-jurisdictional  competition  can  support 
political “Bildung”, the formation (and more likely realization) of political preferences. 
Humboldt  (p.45),  after  having  discarded  any  solicitude  of  the  state  for  “positive 
welfare”, asks: “Should it be objected to these assertions that it appears somewhat strange to 
deny the State a privilege which is accorded to every individual, viz. to propose rewards, to 
extend loans, to be a land-owner”? No, he writes, since the state differs in one crucial respect: 
its monopoly of power. By contrast, “the influence of a private person is liable to diminution 
and decay, from competition, dissipation of fortune, nay even death; ... clearly none of these 
contingencies can be applied to the State”.  
However, no state can rid itself completely from the contingencies of competition with 
likewise  powerful  rivals:  other  states  that  offer  more  attractive  conditions  for  owners  of 
mobile resources. Institutional competition amongst many (thus: preferably small states) has 
often been praised by classical liberals and found by (economic) historians as a way to limit 
the powers of the state.
26  
I have already pointed out that openness and peacefulness are conditions that tend  at 
the same time to favour small states (both in terms of size and scope) and  to be favoured and 
fostered by  these small states. With openness comes competition, the option of “exit” for 
owners of mobile resources. This very option tends to “tame Leviathan”, viz. to set limits to 
its powers to tax and to enforce “positive welfare” interventions on its people. The very logic 
can  be  framed  in  terms  of  Mancur  Olson’s  (1993)  model  of  the  state  as  “bandit”: 
Expropriation  and  violence  is  worst  with  citizens  exposed  to  mobile,  “roving  bandits”. 
“Stationary bandits” or autocratic states (having a longer time-horizon) are taking less life, 
liberty and money than roving bandits, but they would still try to enrich themselves as much 
as they can, based on their monopoly of coercion and taxation. Democratic states (having to 
please a majority of voters) are, according to Olson, further limited in their rational self-
interest to expropriate their citizens. Competition between states creates even further limits on 
the states’ ability to coerce and tax: with stationary bandits (democratic or autocratic), but 
mobile citizens, the self-interested calculus of governments is exposed to even more limiting 
factors. 
I take it that the case for inter-jurisdictional (especially: tax) competition as a limiting 
factor on the states’s power is rather well established and in no need for further explanation.
27 
                                                 
26 See Vaubel (2008) for a comprehensive survey of the history of ideas with references e.g. to David Hume, 
Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Lord Acton, Montesquieu, Turgot, de Tocqueville, Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, and the modern literature including Geoffrey Brennan, James Buchanan, Friedrich von Hayek, and 
economic historians already mentioned in footnote 2. 
27 See Feld/Kirchgässner/Schaltegger (2003) for a survey of the empirical evidence that mostly conforms the 
decentralization  hypothesis  of  Brennan/Buchanan  (1980,  p.185)  that  “total  government  intrusion  into  the 
economy  should  be  smaller,  ceteris  paribus,  the  greater  the  extent  to  which  taxes  and  expenditures  are 
decentralized”. Although some empirical studies deny this effect, the Swiss experience clearly shows that tax 
competition favors a smaller size of government (and shifts government revenue from taxes to user charges). The 10 
 
Therefore,  I  would  rather  like  to  stress  the  evolutionary  merit  of  inter-jurisdictional 
competition that goes beyond its limiting role. Competition beyond borders can also have an 
enabling function – for citizens and politicians alike. Competition, also political and inter-
jurisdictional, benefits from and creates Humboldt’s “varieties of situations”; it is in Hayek’s 
(1968/78) terms, a “discovery procedure”. 
Competition between political alternatives (be they ideas, party platforms, or whole 
legal systems), like market competition, is justified primarily on the grounds that we do not 
know  in  advance  which  opinions  and  alternatives  exist  and  which  policies  under  which 
conditions are considered ‘right’ or ‘acceptable’ by those who have to endure them. Thus, 
very much like Hayek’s (1968/78, p.179) advocacy of the freedom to compete (“if anyone 
really knew all about what economic theory calls the data, competition would indeed be a 
very wasteful method of securing adjustment to these data”), one could state: if anyone knew 
all about political opinions and opportunities, which most of the economics of politics treats 
as data (given preferences, given issue-space), also political decentralization and competition 
would be a rather wasteful method and a government by élite consent may be preferable. 
From an evolutionary-liberal position, our lack of knowledge and hence the high probability 
of  mistaken  perceptions  and  theories  does  not  represent  a  problem.  On  the  contrary,  the 
dispersion and lack of knowledge provides the main justification for political competition. As 
Hayek (1978, p.148) put it: “more successful solutions of the problems of society are to be 
expected if we do not rely on the application of anyone’s given knowledge, but encourage the 
interpersonal  process  of  the  exchange  of  opinion  from  which  better  knowledge  can  be 
expected to emerge”. 
These  arguments  support  even  more  the  idea  of  supplementing  representative 
democracy with direct democracy and inter-jurisdictional competition. General elections do 
not continuously signal citizens’ opinions on particular policies. By focusing on specific acts 
of legislation, referenda and popular initiatives communicate political preferences much more 
concretely. Even more importantly: they provoke political opinion formation as a result of 
deliberation focused on concrete alternatives, thus leading to the creation and social use of 
political skills and knowledge in society. In addition, if combined with fiscal decentralization 
and fiscal referenda, direct democracies tend to reduce the state’s power to tax
28. 
Inter-jurisdictional competition (“exit”’) also expresses popular discontent, albeit more 
indirectly (than “voice”)
29. Compared to voting for representatives, exit entails the individual 
choice of rules instead of a collective choice of rulers (Wohlgemuth 2008). It is based on 
individuals’ comparative appraisals of the net benefits of combining their mobile resources 
with  various  existing  political  infrastructures  in  alternative  jurisdictions.  Using  exit, 
individuals can free themselves (to some extent) from forced consumption of political goods 
and communicate the results of their comparative institutional analysis via personal decisions. 
As an ongoing selection mechanism, exit is therefore much more likely to provide political 
analogues to evolutionary market competition and to the system of relative prices as devices 
for the discovery and use of local knowledge. Inter-jurisdictional competition qualifies the 
monopoly power of governments and enables citizens to actively choose between concrete 
sets of political alternatives; it introduces a politically effective form of parallel rather than 
consecutive innovation and learning from real-life experiences (Vanberg 1993, p.15). 
                                                                                                                                                         
observation that adherents of “positive welfare” on the left tend to associate themselves with very conservative 
nations  of  national  “sovereignty”  to  be  defended  against  “fiscal  federalism”,  “tax  competition”  and 
“globalization”,  whereas  classical  liberals  welcome  open  borders  and  inter-jurisdictional  competition  as  an 
expression of individual sovereignty and as a means to limit government to me is indication enough that both 
camps are right in their fears or hopes. 
28  See  Feld et. al. (2008)  or Feld and Kirchgässner (2001)  for evidence mostly  with reference to Swiss 
experiences with popular democracy. 
29 See Hirschman (1970). 11 
 
Again,  neoclassical  accounts  of  inter-jurisdictional  competition  can  produce  both: 
welfare-enhancing effects (following the seminal contribution by Tiebout 1956) or welfare-
destroying effects (following the tradition of Musgrave 1959). Whether a ‘race to the top’ or 
‘a race to the bottom’ is more likely to emerge depends critically on initial assumptions about 
the political status quo. Starting from the assumption of the state as the ideal provider of 
public  goods,  any  change  triggered  by  competitive  pressures  is  likely  to  lead  ‘downhill’. 
Starting from a ‘Leviathan’ model of political misuse of its monopoly, exit and ‘yardstick 
competition’ is very likely to make citizens better off. 
Compared to these ‘pure’ theories that treat political preferences as given and known, 
and the consequences of (given) alternative policies as equally beyond doubt, evolutionary 
theories that regard political opinions and political problem-solutions as fallible ‘hypotheses’ 
offer additional, more realistic arguments – mostly in favor of open borders, decentralization 
and  inter-jurisdictional  variety  and  mobility  (Wohlgemuth  2008).  Evolutionary  political 
economy tends to raise different doubts about harmonization and centralization, e.g., in the 
European Union or federal states. Issues such as ‘experimentation’, ‘discovery’, ‘correction of 
errors’ (or limitation of the scale of errors), ‘learning’, ‘reversibility’ are standard currency for 
evolutionary thinkers; they do not devaluate standard economic issues such as ‘efficiency’, 
‘allocation’, or ‘incentives’. But they add important aspects that deserve attention in positive 
analysis and normative advice.
30 This also holds for my following analysis of the boundaries 
of today’s Europe. 
 
5. The European Union: too big and too small 
 
Where are the borders of Europe? And: what are the limits of the activities of the European 
Union? The first question is especially intriguing to ask here in Istanbul where many claim 
that  one  border  runs  right  here  in  the  middle  of  the  Bosporus.  The  second  question  is 
especially urgent to ask at a time when many claim that the EU (and the ECB) have gone 
beyond legal boundaries that were set to limit their authority – and that the EU is developing 
into an interventionist “super-state”. 
   Let me retrace my steps and give you my account of the overall (mis-)construction of 
the EU. My argument is that, right from the beginning, the Union has been both too big and 
too small – both in terms of size (membership) and scope (intensity). Or, in Humboldt’s 
words, European integration has not (enough) been lead by the principles of individual liberty 
and the variety of situations.  This  can be shown by means  of rather simple intuitions of 





James  Buchanan  (1965)  initiated  an  immense  club-theoretical  literature.  While  Buchanan 
focused on one club good only, more recent approaches analyze clubs that produce multiple 
goods.  Moreover,  club  theory  has  been  applied  to  international  issues  and  international 
organizations  such  as  the  EU  (Brueckner/Lee  1991;  Cornes/Sandler  1996,  p.404ff, 
Ahrens/Hoen/Ohr 2005).  
As a simple definition, clubs are voluntary associations formed by individuals to pursue a 
common goal – the provision of a club good. Originally, the theory of clubs was meant to 
overcome Samuelson’s  dichotomy between pure public and pure private goods with  club 
                                                 
30 On fiscal federalism as a ‘laboratory’ that allows learning from policy innovations in other states see Oates 
(1999), on interjurisdictional competition as a creative discovery procedure and learning device see Vihanto 
(1992),  Kerber/Heine  (2003),  Wohlgemuth  (2008).  On  “yardstick  competition”  and  the  pressure  for  policy 
imitation or innovation, see Besley/Case (1995) or Rincke (2005).  
31 This part summarizes some basic ideas developed with Claudia Brandi (Wohlgemuth/Brandi 2006 and 2007). 12 
 
goods  ranging  somewhere  in  between.  Accordingly,  club  goods  display  two  defining 
attributes:  
 
(a) they are non-rival in consumption to club members (or only partially rival, i.e. non-rival 
up to a certain number of members), which means that if one member benefits, this does 
not reduce the amount of benefits for other members;  
(b) the benefits of club goods cannot be enjoyed by non-members, i.e. exclusion is possible. 
This prevents free-riding; if a member does not pay his dues or perform his duties, she can 
be deprived of the benefits of club membership.  
 
Club theory helps identify the optimal size of the association both in terms of the optimal 
number members and the optimal intensity of club goods to be produced. The optimal club 
size is reached when marginal benefits for the club members from accepting an additional 
member are just equal to the marginal costs that are incurred from adding one more member 
to  the  club.  Traditional  club  theory  often  assumes  partial  rivalry  of  club  good  benefits 
implying that a large number of members will result in “crowding” or “congestion” effects 
which reduce the quality of the goods and services provided by the club. Moreover, traditional 
club theory assumes that per capita production costs decrease with an increase in the number 
of club members because provision expenses associated with the club good will be shared 
among more members. These assumptions, whilst appropriate in the case of swimming pools 
or golf clubs, are not necessarily adequate in the European Union as a club. Some important 
specifications include: 
One should conceptualise the EU as a club of states, not individuals. Also, the EU 
provides a variety of club goods to its members
32. And most importantly, not all club goods 
are necessarily “good” for all members – some might be (or turn out to be) “bads”. The EU’s 
“aquis  communautaire”  does  not  at  all  “offer”  a  “variety  of  situations”,  but  makes  it 
obligatory for all (now: 27) member states to transform into national law some estimated 500 
000 pages of European laws, regulations and directives. This “uniformity” of Europe’s “one 
size-fits-all” approach to integration must come at a cost, as I shall try to show now. 
 
2.2 Deeper or wider Union? 
 
Deepening or widening the European Union has always been a matter of dispute amongst 
European élites (European citizens were rarely asked on both accounts). Here, the trade-off 
between boundaries (size of EU-government) and borders (size of the Union) has always 
played  a  strategic  role:  The  deepening-sceptics  (such  as  leaders  in  the  UK  or  the  Czech 
Republic) are very much in favour of enlargement whilst keeping unanimity decisions in the 
Council (of ministers or heads of state) intact; their motive: widening would forestall even 
further deepening. The deepening-enthusiasts (such as leaders in France, and Germany), in 
turn,  stress  the  “absorption  capacity”  –  which  includes  the  further  centralization  and 
                                                 
32 These include the guarantee of the “Four Freedoms”, i.e. the free movement of goods, services, persons and 
capital through the Internal Market; external and internal security through a common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP) and police and judicial collaboration in criminal affairs. Further examples of European club goods are 
the definition of environmental and product standards and (as selective sub-club-services) a single currency 
through membership in the EMU, the Schengen Agreement and Convention and the Western European Union. 
Additionally, stronger coordination in social, employment, industrial and education policies has been put on the 
European agenda striving for EU-wide harmonized standards and centrally provided policy instruments. All of 
the above goods have in common that they are (i) non-rival (or only partially rival) in consumption and (ii) that 
non-subscribers to the respective agreements (be that within-EU-treaties or bilateral treaties of third countries 
with the EU) are excluded from their consumption. Therefore these goods qualify as club goods. 13 
 
harmonization  capacity  –  of  the  Union  which  tends  to  decrease  with  the  capacity  or 
willingness of new members to accept the blessings of an increasing “acquis”. 
  Both  strategies  make  rational  sense  –  but  still:  the  trade-off  between  limits  and 
borders, between deepening and widening the Union is tragically bound to not allowing a 
Humboldtian “diversity of situations” to develop within the Union (and its member states as 
well). It is the combined assumptions of “once and for all”, “one size fits all” and “all or 
nothing” that are at the heart of Europe’s misconstruction. Both economic club-theory and 
common  sense  can  make  this  clear.  In  the  following  passages  I  briefly  discuss  three 
remarkably different integration areas of the EU in order to demonstrate in which ways both 
benefits and costs of integration are contingent on the “boundaries of the EU” both in terms of 
membership and intensity.  
a) The Internal Market Club 
EU club goods corresponding to the Internal Market include the “peace dividend” derived 
from mutual gains from trade and enhanced international division of labour and knowledge. 
All  members  gain  by  being  in  the  Internal  Market  club  which  results  both  in  static  and 
dynamic efficiency gains. These gains are larger, the more members the Internal Market club 
has. As Adam Smith (1776) already knew: “the division of labour is limited by the extent of 
the market”. Hence, there is no direct rivalry in club good usage; to the contrary, additional 
members promote the welfare of given members.  
If the EU were only a free trade area, it would be too small. The optimal size of a free 
trade agreement is the world. A pure disarmament club merely focused on the prohibition of 
trade intervention or enforcing negative liberty rights would barely be dependent on scarce 
resources  like  tax-payers  money  or the enlightened  consent  of citizens, as  Hayek already 
argued in 1939
33. But positive regulation concerning political integration, which can – at least 
partly – be useful for the functioning of the Internal Market, is a different matter.  
With respect to positive regulations such as competition rules, consumer protection 
rules  or  production  standards  within  the  EU,  active  collective  choices  are  necessary  and 
political views and capacities diverge. As a consequence, decision-making costs rise. These 
costs  are  kept  relatively  low  by  delegation  to  the  Commission.  However,  the  natural 
centralization  and  harmonization  drive  of  a  central  bureaucracy  can  result  in  increasing 
external  costs  as  the  EU-club  becomes  larger,  more  heterogeneous  and  more  actively 
interventionist
34. A “complete” Internal Market à la Brussels, therefore, has a finite optimal 
club size. 
b) The Monetary Union Club  
The club good corresponding to the Euro-zone (EMU) is the single currency. The politicians’ 
great hopes (ignoring many economists’ warnings) were manifold. Some may relate to pure 
strategic games of power-politics (such as the wish to escape the implicit reign of the German 
Bundesbank over European monetary policies or to use monetary union as a Troyan horse 
establishing a fiscal union afterwards or to free-ride on the low interest rates justified by the 
                                                 
33 See Hayek (1939/80, p.255) who argued that “the establishment of economic union will set very definite 
limitations on the realization of widely cherished ambitions”,and  that “the federation will have to possess the 
negative powers of preventing individual states from interfering with economic activity, although it may not 
have the positive power of acting in their stead” (p.267). See Wohlgemuth/Sideras (2004).for more details on 
this argument. We also find that, lacking a clearer view of Public Choice, Hayek’s vision was somewhat over-
optimistic. 
34 “External costs” in the sense of Buchanan/Tullock (1962) occur when a participant in a collective decision has 
to accept a collective choice that does not reflect her preferred alternative (see Wohlgemuth/Brandi 2006 for a 
wider application of this concept to European decision-making).  14 
 
relative robustness of other Euro-members). Other hopes were based on more (economically) 
rational grounds such as reduced transaction costs and currency risks which can lead to more 
trade, economies of scale, intensified competition and thus general welfare gains.  
  However, as now has turned out to be a tragic mistake, the experiment was too bold 
membership too comprehensive. EMU members are now realizing the consequences of being 
deprived of two crucial policy instruments and market stabilizers: monetary policy (interest 
rates) and exchange rates. I cannot here discuss the details of how this created early on an 
unsustainable credit-boom in the formerly high-interest (low competitiveness) periphery and 
many years of stagnation in Germany
35. The basic economic rationale is simple enough: The 
more heterogeneous the economic structures of the EMU member countries are, the more 
their  economic  policy  objectives  diverge  and  the  more  divergen t  the  endog enous  and 
exogenous economic shocks affecting EMU member states are, the less will  a  common 
inflation goal,  a  uniform interest rate policy and  a  common external currency value be 
consistent with reasonable adjustment strategies of individual member states.  
c) The Common Agricultural Policy Club  
Finally, the EU engages (with still the largest part of its budget) in “solicitudes of positive 
welfare”  that  already  Humboldt  (p.21)  maintained  are  “positively  hurtful  in  their 
consequences, and wholly irreconcilable with a true system of polity”: “the encouragement of 
agriculture, industry, and commerce”. And it does so on a scale of a market with some 500 
million peoples! Obviously hurtful policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
have an optimal club size of zero. There is no economic mutual benefit of a policy that 
deliberately  raises  consumer  prices,  generates  overproduction,  administrative  costs  and 
devastates the prospects of poor countries.  
 
5.3 Flexible voluntary integration 
 
As suggested by many observers (see Wohlgemuth/Brandi 2007; Siedentop 2000; Alesina et. 
al. 2001), the extent of current policy harmonization in the acquis is too large because it 
includes policy fields in which the benefits resulting from the exploitation of scale economies 
and the internalization of externalities are much smaller than the external costs caused by 
policy  centralisation.  This  would  imply  that  the  number  of  integration  domains  currently 
included in the acquis communautaire ought to be reduced and transformed into a core-acquis 
comprising only those policy fields for which harmonization offers clear mutual gains.  
In  this  context,  the  Union  would  act  as  a  “guardian”  of  the  core-acquis  and  as  a 
“broker”,  “monitor”  and  “arbiter”  of  a  variable  structure  of  open,  flexible,  competing 
integration clubs
36. According to this approach, all members of the EU are members of the 
core; membership in the various sub -clubs is optional. Thereby, the club -of-clubs approach 
allows for different intensities of membership  in the EU; yet, in contrast to the conce ntric 
circles model, the focus is on policies, not on countries. In other words,  flexible integration 
would be functional rather than geographical
37.  
Flexible integration according to the clubs -within-the-club strategy, a process by 
which all member states agree to disagree about their priorities but permit their members to go 
                                                 
35 See, e.g. Sinn (2010) on the fundamental reasons of the present Euro credit and balance of payments crisis.  
36 Frey/Eichenberger (e.g. 2000) were amongst the first to suggest flexible, overlapping, competing jurisdictions.  
37 The concentric circle (but also: Europe à deux vitesses)  approach is much more rigid than the club -of-clubs 
strategy. According to the concentric circles approach, flexibility is implemented by a system of derogations and 
opt-outs and the integration s equence is fixed in advance. Our approach would be more flexible by giving 
member states complete freedom to create new forms of cooperation or deepen existing ones and by keeping no 
member from leaving any sphere of integration. Our model pictures Europe to consist of member countries as 
members of different clubs rather than as one single club with different classes. 15 
 
ahead with objectives which they share as a sub-group, caters both to the divergent needs of 
individual  member  states  and  to  the  disparities  of  economic  and  political  structures  in  a 
heterogeneous group of 27 and more countries. At the same time, the clubs-within-the-club 
approach breaks down one high integration hurdle – the acquis – into a lower one – the core-
acquis – and various optional hurdles.  
Since no member is required to accept any common policy that it dislikes, external 
costs  (inadequate  collective  decisions  in  the  sense  of  Buchanan/Tullock  1962)  would  be 
significantly  reduced.  Moreover,  decision-making  costs  would  be  considerably  lower  for 
decisions made in various smaller and more homogeneous clubs than for decisions made in 
the overall Union. This enlarges the “variety of situations”; however, not country by country 
in  an  all-or-nothing  way,  but  issue  by  issue,  according  to  national  citizens’  needs  and 
preferences. 
The remaining core-acquis “minimal Union” should contain well-defined integration 
areas for which integration is regarded as essential, the most important of which are the basic, 
Kantian  “universalizable”  provisions  of  the  Internal  Market
38.  With the exception of the 
Internal Market there is no theoretically unchallenged consensus about which policy fields 
should be in the core – whose optimal size would be infinity after all
39. 
It is not the idle product of ideal-type economic reasoning to imagine several different-
sized EU-sub-clubs with various members across different policy fields instead of one single 
overall EU-club comprising 27 and more heterogeneous members. Even though they are still 
exceptions, there already are a number of different-sized “sub-clubs” within the EU. While, 
for instance, the Internal Market covers all EU members, some policy clubs comprise only a 
subgroup of EU-members, such as the EMU, and some embrace several EU-members as well 
as non-EU-members, such as the Western European Union (WEU). 
Conceiving  the  EU  as  a  club  of  clubs  is  not  only  consistent  with  neoclassical 
economics; it is also compatible with the basic “mutual gains” notion of the contractarian 
constitutional  paradigm  which  is  all  about  “seeking  to  explore  potential  gains  from 
cooperation”  (Vanberg  2003,  p.18).  In  view  of  this  paradigm,  we  can  summarize  the 
advantages of flexible instead of one-size-fits-all integration.  
 
(a) Combination of commitment and flexibility. The club-of-clubs procedure allows for greater 
variety and diversity without endangering the great achievements of European integration, 
namely the Internal Market and the “Four Freedoms”. This model yields a combination of 
commitment and flexibility that is superior both to the status quo and to other proposals 
for flexible integration like multi-speed or concentric circles.  
(b)  Reduction  of  integration  costs.  Although  administrative  costs  might  increase  as  a 
consequence of dealing with numerous (sub-) clubs, our model may in sum be relatively 
cost efficient. With voluntary club-formation amongst the capable and willing, the costs of 
finding consensus will decrease. A decentralized, competitive process of voluntary club 
formation would also lower external costs because countries, and possibly sub-national 
units,  can  search  for  cooperation  regarding  those  functions  in  which  they  have  a  real 
                                                 
38 Wohlgemuth/Sideras (2004, p.20f) argue that the provisions of the Internal Market contain key elements of an 
universalisable order resembling Hayek’s (1939/80) vision of “Interstate Federalism”. 
39 See also Harrop (2000, p.308) or Warleigh (2002, p.64). According to Alesina et al. (2001), the “hard core” 
should  also  include  international  trade  policy  and  anti-trust.  Moreover,  it  may  contain  convertibility  of 
currencies, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as police and judicial cooperation of all EU 
members  in  criminal  matters  that  show  cross-country  externalities.  For  instance,  the  clubs-within-the-club 
approach may be a useful means to strengthen the operational side of cooperation in the field of security policy 
via trans-national police forces, border guards, a European judicial area and intelligence cooperation. See also 
Feld (2003: 308) on judicial cooperation in cross-country criminal matters like protection against terrorism and 
Persson et al. (1997, p.26) on political economy reflections on why there is reluctance to centralize defence 
policy. 16 
 
demand for cooperation, and they are not forced into cooperation with respect to functions 
for which there is no such demand. Voluntary entry and exit may also reduce the risk of 
blackmailing by veto-players and necessity for mutual haggling over privileges via log-
rolling against the common interests of citizens (Wohlgemuth/Sideras 2004, p.23).  
(c) Responsiveness to citizens’ preferences. Institutional competition and thus the freedom of 
citizens  to  choose  between  institutional  arrangements  of  numerous  clubs  that  involve 
different costs and benefits, alongside the freedom of clubs to modify and differentiate 
their  institutional  supply,  should  lead  to  a  better  alignment  of  policies  with  citizens’ 
preferences (and stricter limits to the states’ power to tax and intervene, see part 4). Inter-
jurisdictional  competition  among  the  various  integration  clubs  should  enhance  citizen 
sovereignty  and  make  self-interested  politicians  more  responsive  to  citizens’  interest 
(Vanberg 2000: 363). The threat of dissatisfied citizens opting out – thereby foregoing 
their  net  contribution  to  the  club  good  –  provides  an  incentive  to  take  individual 
preferences into account and to provide the respective club good efficiently.  
(d) Flexible Integration as an evolutionary “discovery procedure”. The club-of-clubs concept 
is process-oriented: while it specifies the process of club formation (for example, how new 
clubs may be established), it does not determine the club-of-clubs outcome (for instance, 
what functions are to be provided by which club). Thus, competition among the various 
clubs  can  serve  as  a  knowledge-creating  “discovery  procedure”  of  such  political 
preferences and problem solutions “as, without resort to it, would not be known to anyone, 
or at least would not be utilized” (Hayek 1968/78, p.179, see above).  In evolutionary 
terms,  club  competition  should  also  be  a  less  risky  procedure  to  identify  and  correct 
political  mistakes  and  to  react  to  a  continuously  changing  variety  of  preferences  and 
problems.  Without  competition  among  different  forms  of  integration,  inaptly 
“harmonized”  or  centralized  “policy-hypotheses”  are  –  for  lack  of  observable  and 
selectable alternatives – hard to identify. Moreover, without competition among policy-
clubs,  the  existence  of  irreversible  path  dependence  is  more  likely  because  –  due  to 
complex logrolling agreements – mistakes, even if they are detected, can hardly be revised 
in “integrated”, interwoven policy cartels. 
 
Today,  there  is  an  increasing  concern  with  the  Union’s  “finality”,  its  “borders”  or  its 
“absorption  capacity”.  Puzzled  by  the  popular  rejection  of  its  “constitution”-project, 
overwhelmed by the recent enlargements, and motivated by a more or less hidden uneasiness 
with a potential accession of Turkey, most leaders see the EU “at the crossroads” with no 
clear “roadmap” at hand. All this metaphoric talk, accompanied by an escape to symbolic 
politics (e.g. “Lisbon agenda”), sounds at times rather esoteric to a more pragmatic economist. 
But  these  concerns  do  seem  justified  as  long  as  both  the  given  integration  status  and 
traditional integration strategies are taken for granted. With a heavily inflated acquis, an non-
transparent  and  often  inefficient  use  of  a  large  portion  of  the  EU’s  budget,  cumbersome 
decision-making procedures  and  growing popular disenchantment  with  “Brussels”, further 
enlargement and deepening must almost necessarily be regarded as contradictory purposes of 
the Union.  
“Finality”, “borders” or “absorption capacity” owe their dramatic and gloomy clout to 
the traditional combination of two unnecessarily holistic and constructivist ideologies: “one-
size-fits-all”  (for  full-member-states)  and  “all-or-nothing”  (for  would-be  member-states). 
Both fronts seem now slowly to relax. But a more radical relaxation, as proposed in our club-
model, seems to offer a much more adequate solution to many concerns troubling European 
governments and citizens. Both deepening and widening could be achieved simultaneously, if 
they were based on integration of the capable and willing in  specific policy areas  where 
consent can be found without the traditional resort to power politics, bundling special interests 
from diverging policy fields.  17 
 
Our  model  of  a  Union  of  clubs  in  addition  to  a  common  acquis  reduced  to  an 
undisputed  and  reasonable  core  of  universalisable  policies  also  has  implications  for  the 
European Neighbourhood Policies (ENP). Current ENP-strategies have noble causes, to be 
sure. At the same time, they seem to be aimed at calming and comforting both EU neighbours 
(potentially  want-to-be-members)  and  existing  EU  members  by  offering  cooperation  (and 
financial support) without full membership – which would indeed pose grave problems of 
absorption capacity of the EU and adoption capacities of our neighbours. Our model offers 
much more immediate and flexible comfort. Full membership would be reduced to such core-
areas where mutual gains from joint commitment can be offered to both the existing and to 
many  new  members.  Hence,  it  would  be  comparatively  easy  to  turn  “neighbours”  into 
“members”, e.g. of a core Union based on free trade or political coordination in Humboldt’s 
fields of the true state activity such as common defence and security.  
 





At least in Europe, a truly Humboldtian minimal state (if ever there was one), has become a 
most daring vision. Today Europe is much rather bound to further betray her classical liberal 
heritage. By ways of “harmonizing” and centralizing more and more “solicitudes of “positive 
welfare” over more and more citizens, the EU destroys the vital elements that once created the 
“European miracle”: individual freedom and “the diversity of situations”. As Wilhelm Röpke 
(1960, p.244) put it with great emphasis: “Decentrism is of the essence of the spirit of Europe. 
To try to organize Europe centrally, to subject the Continent to a bureaucracy of economic 
planning, and to weld it into a block would be nothing less than a betrayal of Europe and the 
European patrimony”. 
  Times of crisis can make things worse; but a possible break-down of the monetary 
union  may  provide  an  opportunity  to  rethink  the  overall  construction  of  the  Union.  The 
proposal developed in this paper is one option that may in some form suggest itself. It would 
at least bring the EU’s “core aquis” closer to Humboldt’s minimal state. It would give citizens 
greater freedom and availability of diversity. By thus fostering institutional competition, it 
would  at  the  same  time  impose  stricter  limits  on  national  governments  and  lead  to  the 
discovery of better political problem solutions.  
As political borders become less important for economic (and military) viability, there 
can be more (smaller) states – both in terms of nation size and of state activity. Perhaps the 
best  we  can  hope  for  is  more,  open,  borders  to  lead  through  the  “invisible  hand”  of 
competition and “exit” to more effective “boundaries of the state”. 
  –  
  
                                                 
40  This  final  „punch-line“  refers  to  a  quote  of  another  classical-liberal  who  served  as  public  servant  to  the 
European Commission, Lord Dahrendorf (1979): “I have often been struck by the prevailing view in Community 
circles that the worst that can happen is any movement towards what is called a Europe à la carte. This is not 
only somewhat odd for someone who likes to make his own choices, but also illustrates that strange Puritanism, 
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